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NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND The promise of providing all children with a high-quality education is a noble one. But after looking at the projected costs for 10 states to fulfill the requirements of NCLB, Mr. Mathis fears that the federal government is asking too much and giving too little. By William J. Mathis |
IT IS THE cruelest illusion to promise far
more than we will ever deliver. Yet throughout time reformers
of all persuasions have offered Utopian visions in exchange for
permission to shape the world to their view. With great fanfare
about historic turning points and fervent promises to America's
children, in January 2002 President Bush signed into law the No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, the latest reauthorization of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).
The rhetoric was certainly noble, and the law was sold with the
guarantee that, at last, we would leave no student behind. The
poor would have the same as the rich, and the strong arm of a
resolute government would make it so. Public support for equality,
periodic testing, highly qualified teachers, and other provisions
of the law was strong.1 As shown by the 87-10 Senate vote, the law passed
with substantial bipartisan support.
President Bush and Secretary of Education Rod Paige have said
much about the great investments the federal government has made
in education. And in strident tones, the material accompanying
the passage of the law says that the public has a right to demand
great returns on this investment.2
Alas, the promises are far greater than the reality. When the
"historic" federal investments in education are scrutinized,
the first-year increases to Title I compensatory funds amount
to a mere 0.4% of total education spending. When the much-touted
"flexibility" procedures that NCLB gives to local districts
are examined, they allow, at best, a local district to shift around
about 4.3% of its already-committed money.3 When the so-called adequate yearly
progress provisions of the law are examined, independent reviewers,
almost without exception, say the plans are unrealistic.4 Submerged beneath
emotional appeals and rhetorical demands, hard questions about
costs, the adequacy of resources, and the strength of commitments
lie hidden.
The Nation's Financial Commitment
Throughout the last century, critics loudly proclaimed the nation's
peril owing to the alleged poor condition of the schools. Yet
results from the National Assessment of Educational Progress show
that at the end of the century scores in reading and mathematics
had leveled off at a 30-year high, dropouts were near all-time
lows, and our nation's economic supremacy was unquestioned.5 This is hardly
a picture of a "failed" system. But these facts hide
the nation's true educational problems.
Much has been made of the "merely average" test scores
of U.S. students in comparison with those from other countries.
To be sure, U.S. scores on international examinations -- such
as the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)
and the Program of International Student Assessment (PISA) --
are at international averages in reading, math, and science.6 However, it is
just as clear that the U.S. investment in K-12 education is also
less than stellar. We spend the same average amount of our gross
domestic product on elementary schools as other developed countries,
but we fall to the bottom half in our commitment to high schools.7
The greater and more insidious danger, however, is the disparity
in achievement within the United States. International test data
tell us that we have the greatest inequities between our highest-
and lowest-scoring students of any nation.8 In a UNICEF follow-up study, the
gap between our average scorers and our low scorers gives the
U.S. an abysmal ranking of 21st out of 24 industrialized nations
in educational equality.9 While we are getting more productivity than we
pay for, the troubling disparities in achievement reflect our
disparities in funding
NCLB Costs: What We Spend Versus What We Need
In 1989 the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the state constitution
requires the state to provide schools and students with the resources
necessary to meet high state standards. Since that time, state
courts in New Hampshire, Tennessee, Arkansas, Ohio, North Carolina,
and New Jersey have issued similar rulings on behalf of children.
In addition to court actions, the vast majority of states have
enacted standards-based reforms. NCLB adopts these state standards
and imposes progressively harsher penalties on schools if students
do not get passing scores.
Thus figuring out how much NCLB will cost requires knowing how
much it will take to ensure that all students meet the standards
and pass the tests. But how do we know how much money is enough?
Different methods have been used to estimate what is an adequate
amount of money.
The "professional judgment" method uses panels of experts
to carefully define the resources needed for each child to meet
the standards. These resources are then added up to arrive at
a state figure. The "successful school" technique identifies
a set of high-achieving schools, examines their resource allocations
and spending levels, and generalizes to other schools. The "statistical
analysis" approach calculates what it takes to predict a
passing score. These models are particularly useful in determining
regional costs, such as what it would take to attract qualified
teachers to a remote location.
Within the last four years, a new generation of finance studies
has estimated the costs of raising all children's test scores
up to a particular state's standard. While some of these studies
expressly include NCLB costs, most have been based on achieving
the state's own standards -- which have since been folded into
each state's NCLB system. Since each state determines its own
standards, has its own social and political culture, and has its
own level of student needs, a great variety of outcomes exists.
Nevertheless, recent studies in different states, by different
researchers, using different methods, reveal a picture of the
massive costs of making sure all children pass the mandated NCLB
tests.
Indiana. To enable a school to meet the "commendable"
level on state tests, Indiana would have to increase its base
spending from $5,468 to $7,142 per pupil -- a 31% increase --
according to an analysis by Augenblick and Myers, Inc. These estimates
do not include any added costs for special education students,
which range between $7,500 and $8,300 per pupil. They also do
not include the cost of "hard-to-serve students," who
average an additional $4,200 to $5,300 per student.10
Maryland. Calculating
the costs for Maryland students to meet state standards, Augenblick
and Myers, Inc., arrived at a total education cost of $12,060
per pupil for elementary schools, $9,000 for middle schools, and
$9,599 for high schools. The firm further calculated that having
a low-income student meet standards would require an average excess
cost of $7,748 per student, or 1.7 times the base cost. The analysts
used both a market-basket model and a high-achieving-school model
to arrive at costs for their standards-based models. The results
from both methods were similar.11
The total cost for the system for fiscal-year 2000 would have
been between $7.9 and $8.8 billion. Since the expenditures for
that year were $5.9 billion, the required percentage increase
was between 34% and 49%. To Maryland's credit, its lawmakers boosted
education spending by $1.3 billion in spring 2002.12
Montana. Montana's
2002 study was sponsored by five education organizations and assisted
by the National Council of State Legislators. The analysts used
a professional-judgment approach to cost out meeting NCLB requirements
based on the current level of performance. They found that a base
cost between $6,004 and $8,041 per pupil (depending on district
type) was required, while the current base was only $4,471. Additional
special-needs and remedial costs were $8,000 and $2,000 per pupil
respectively. Thus base costs in Montana would increase between
34% and 80%, depending on location and level of need.13
Nebraska. The
state department of education, in cooperation with various education
organizations, commissioned a study of what it would take to meet
current Nebraska standards under NCLB in 2002-03. Estimated costs
range from $5,845 per pupil in a large K-12 district to $11,257
in a small, isolated K-12 district.
On top of this figure, at-risk and special-needs students would
require an additional $1,500 to $12,000 each, depending
on the level of need. "Total costs would vary, on average,
from $8,103 per student in large K-12 districts to $13,525 per
student in very small K-12 districts," says the report.14 Nebraska currently
spends about $5,600 per pupil. Thus the state is looking at a
45% cost increase. NCLB testing and labeling have brought cries
of outrage from Nebraska state and local officials. The state
senate called for full federal funding of the mandate.15
New Hampshire. Mark
Joyce, executive director of the New Hampshire School Administrators
Association, sent his members and the citizens of the state his
analysis of NCLB costs. He found that the state will receive an
average of $77 of new federal money for each of the Granite State's
220,000 students, while the obligations imposed by the law will
cost $575 per student. In other words, New Hampshire will receive
about $17 million in new money for new obligations of $126.5 million.16
To arrive at this number, Joyce estimated a state cost for each
of the elements of the law and added them together. He contends
that his estimates are conservative, and he is probably right.
The reason is that his analysis was confined to increased costs
for local and state staff and administration. He assumed that
the number of special education students would increase by 2%,
but he did not include the costs of remedial programs for underachieving
children. As compared to other states, this procedure results
in a significant underestimate.
New York. Using a statistical technique primarily focused
on regional differences in the costs of meeting standards, Professors
William Duncombe of Syracuse University and Anna Lukemeyer of
the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, arrived at a median statewide
figure of $7,927 for extra remedial costs, on top of
the regular per-pupil expenditure of $9,781. They provide several
regional cost variations at different proficiency standards. Their
overall regional cost adjustments add 16% to total education spending.
New York's Campaign for Fiscal Equity launched a major costing
study using both the successful-schools and professional-judgment
models. A report of the results is expected in early 2004.17
South Carolina. To
estimate the costs of getting 85% of South Carolina students to
the "basic" level of the state's Palmetto tests and
all students to pass the graduation tests in 2011, the 1999 base
cost of $4,990 would have to be increased to $6,189 by 2005-06.
This figure represents a 24% increase. However, it does not include
the costs of at-risk and special education students. When figures
for these populations are added in, the cost rises to $9,182 per
pupil (an 84% increase), according to Augenblick and Myers, Inc.,
whose analysts used a professional-judgment model.18 Spending in South Carolina must
nearly double --
going from $3.1 billion in 1999 to a projected $6 billion in 2006.
Texas. While Texas saw large increases in the percentage
of students passing the state test, these tests were at an eighth-grade,
basic-skills level.19 Even with the low standards, statistical modeling
of NCLB costs on earlier data would require an increase in state
aid of 101% or 6.9 billion new state dollars. Assuming the local
contribution remained the same, this is about a 35% increase in
spending. For comparison purposes, the Bush Administration has
proposed a $1-billion increase for the nation as a whole for fiscal
year 2004.20
In Texas, the largest increases are needed in the districts with
very low-wealth populations and in the very large-city districts.
A new test is being implemented in Texas. Obviously, if the standards
are raised, the remedial costs will go up proportionately.
Vermont. In my own study of Vermont's situation, I counted
the number of students below state standards. Depending on the
test and grade level, Vermont scores between 22 and 32 percentile
points above national norms, and this advantage over the nation
is increasing. Nevertheless, because Vermont has extremely high
standards, 46.5% of the students "fail" one of the tests.
I assumed that one-fourth of these students would be able to reach
the standards within existing resources. Using estimates from
adequacy-cost studies and looking at the number of students affected
by poverty and those with moderate needs, I arrived at additional
remediation costs for the state of $149.5 million. Testing costs
and lost instructional time added $8.7 million to that figure,
for a total of $158.2 million in new costs. However, the state
receives only $51.6 million in all titles of ESEA combined.21 Vermont would
add 15.5% to its total school costs for remediation and testing
alone.
Wisconsin. Using parameters supplied by the Institute for
Wisconsin's Future, Whitney Allgood and Richard Rothstein found
that adequate funding in Wisconsin would be $11,231 per pupil,
averaged across all pupils in the state. For high-risk pupils,
the cost would be $27,879 per pupil -- more than 2.5 times the
cost of previous estimates. In arriving at this figure, the authors
demonstrated that overcoming the effects of poverty requires interventions
beyond the traditional school. Thus they included community clinics,
before- and after-school programs, early childhood intervention,
and summer school programs.22
Simply teaching children will have little effect if they return
to bad neighborhoods, single-parent homes, foster care, inadequate
health care, and a general lack of support. The authors marshaled
convincing evidence that expecting students to reach high standards
without essential support systems in place overestimates the ability
of schools to cure social ills.23
A follow-up study in 2002 by the Institute for Wisconsin's Future
determined that $11,121 per pupil in school spending was needed,
but the current level was only $8,241. The difference represents
a 35% increase for Wisconsin spending.24
Estimating the National Costs of NCLB
These cost studies from 10 states are all based on bringing the
state's children up to an academic standard. As we have seen,
they vary considerably in methods, assumptions, and procedures,
and they use a variety of analytic techniques. All are recent.
Yet, for all their diversity, a number of unambiguous findings
emerge.
Public spending on K-12 education was $422.7
billion in 2001-02.27 If we use a broad -- yet easily justified and
extremely conservative -- estimate of 20% added costs for the
nation as a whole, that translates into a national increase of
about $84.5 billion. An estimate of 35% additional costs yields
a national increase of $148 billion.
For comparison purposes, the current federal Title I appropriation
is $11.3 billion, and the Administration's budget request of $12.3
billion is below the authorized amount of $18 billion in NCLB.28 President
Bush said in his weekly radio address of 4 January 2003 that the
additional $1 billion was "more than enough money" and
that "we are insisting that schools use that money wisely."29
Who Has to Pay the NCLB Bill?
Legal scholars have opined that the federal government cannot
be sued to force adequate funding of the law. In fact, Secretary
of Education Richard Riley in a letter dated 19 January 2001 said
that states have the responsibility of providing educational resources
to meet new standards: "Indeed, raising standards without
closing resource gaps may have the perverse effect of exacerbating
achievement gaps and of setting up many children for failure."30
The alternative for states is to reject the federal money and,
along with it, the mandates. However, if states take the money
and require local districts to meet state standards, then these
same local districts can legally demand that the state provide
adequate money to meet these standards. Local districts can cite
a growing number of financial adequacy studies to support their
case in the courts.
With the National Governors' Association estimating that states
face a total fiscal-year 2003 deficit of $58 billion, state governments
will be hard pressed to fund an additional $84.5 billion -- to
say nothing of $148 billion. In many states, budgets are being
balanced in part by cutting education dollars. Tax cuts, a sluggish
economy, and the cost of war in Iraq all suggest that significant
fiscal help will not be forthcoming from the federal government.
Few reasonable people argue against the idea that all children
must be well educated or that extra services must be made available
for our most needy. In fact, it has been the dream of many educators
throughout our nation's history. However, if funding remains inadequate,
then at best the law will represent the attenuated efforts of
an overpromising government, which will leave behind our poorest
and most needy children.
Promised Benefits: Accountability
The primary promised benefit of NCLB is that 95% of all student
groups will reach their state test standards by 2014. Obviously,
we don't know if that goal can or will be reached. But if the
system is not adequately funded, then reaping that benefit is
a remote and forlorn hope.
Assessing the possible benefits of NCLB requires answering two
questions -- one technical, the other about values. The technical
question is whether the system can ever work. At the heart of
the plan is the requirement that each subgroup of students in
each school improve test scores in equal yearly increments. That
is, they are required to make "adequate yearly progress"
(AYP). The values question is whether the goals of the system,
narrowly conceived as improved test scores, are the right goals
for public education in a democratic society.
Promised Benefits: 'Adequate Yearly Progress'
There is simply no body of accepted scientific knowledge that
says that all students and all subgroups of students can reach
meaningful high standards, at the required AYP pace, given the
levels of funding and the lack of social, economic, and family
assets of many of our children. It is also doubtful that the "machinery"
will work. Indeed, there is scant evidence that the AYP train
can even get out of the station.
Test score reliability. The centerpiece of NCLB is the
requirement that test scores must improve annually. Before NCLB
became law, Thomas Kane and Douglas Staiger demonstrated that
70% of the year-to-year change in test scores for grade levels
or schools is simply random variation.31 Differences in the student body
from one year to the next, combined with the statistical error
in the tests themselves, make it impossible to know whether the
tests are measuring real gains (or losses) or whether the changes
are merely random noise.
Similarly, Walt Haney examined the scores of all Massachusetts
schools. He found that those that received a medallion for large
gains in one year saw those gains disappear the following year.32 In Florida,
the same pattern emerged, with 69% of the schools that posted
gains in the first cycle of testing falling back in the next cycle.33 In Maine,
Jaekyung Lee found the same phenomenon and noted that the random
fluctuation, not surprisingly, increased as the size of the school
decreased.34
The problems become far more difficult as the number of subgroups
increases. A school with a diverse population (and many subgroups)
has many more opportunities to fail. Thus the diverse school,
which faces greater challenges, is penalized.
Likewise, many rural and small schools do not have enough students
in a grade level or a population subgroup to draw valid conclusions.
While some states call for a minimum of 30 or 50 students in a
subgroup, new analyses are finding that these cell sizes are still
too small to validly measure AYP gains. For example, modeling
in Vermont shows that 170 students per grade level are needed
for the scores to be stable.35
Validity. Most
states claim that their testing systems are "aligned"
with their state curriculum standards. Generally, this means that
they are not grossly incompatible. It does not mean that they
are a faithful, accurate, and balanced representation of the state's
standards for instruction. Since most tests are geared toward
reading and mathematics, social studies and science get short
shrift. Even within math and reading, the ability of any test
to sample validly an ever-expanding knowledge base is suspect.
The reading and math wars demonstrate that even these basic areas
are subject to great controversy. Moreover, different tests give
different results for the same students -- even when they are
supposedly measuring knowledge of the same subject matter.36
Testing companies, state agencies, and local districts all have
their own incentives to keep the time, amount, and expense of
testing to a minimum. The result, unfortunately, is a tradeoff.
Thus it is doubtful that any state accountability test can be
considered a valid and representative sampling of the state's
curriculum expectations for an educated youth.
Improvement of learning through tests. Each year, the
NCLB system progressively increases sanctions against schools
that do not meet annual growth targets. Ultimately, the state
could take over the school, change its management, or disband
it altogether. The assumption is that the fear of these penalties
will drive schools to even higher levels of performance.
Leaving aside whether schools have the resources and whether students
have the social capital to reach the high levels sought by NCLB,
it is questionable whether punitive incentive systems work. (B.
F. Skinner disproved negative reinforcement systems 45 years ago.)
In looking at 18 states with high-stakes testing systems, Audrey
Amrein and David Berliner considered the scores on the high-stakes
tests along with the scores on other tests. If all scores went
up, they concluded that learning was taking place. If only the
high-stakes scores went up, they concluded that test preparation
and curriculum narrowing were taking place. They found that scores
on the other tests were not related to scores on high-stakes tests.
Thus the basic assumption that high-stakes systems lead to improved
learning must be suspect at least.37
Texas is cited as a state in which the increase in the percentage
of students meeting the standards was paralleled by increases
in the state's scores on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress. However, the low level of the state's tests and the
very different trend lines of the state and NAEP tests call this
conclusion into question. More troubling still is that the increase
in test scores was not accompanied by increases in outcomes
of high value, such as increased high school completion or college
attendance.38
Unintended Consequences
The assumption of the NCLB system is that the test results represent
what an educated person should know and be able to do. Few would
say that an educated person only has high test scores. Most would
say good scores are desirable but not sufficient to define an
educated person. Most would say that schools must also produce
good citizens, strong family members, contributors to society,
and people engaged in democratic governance. None of these characteristics
are measured by or deemed of importance in the federal accountability
system. Along the way, a number of unintended consequences also
appear likely.
Curriculum narrowing. As noted above, statewide achievement
tests do not measure the vast expanse of curriculum set forth
by states and school districts. Tests tend to measure those things
that are easy to measure, in an efficient and economical way.
This means that the focus is on lower-order thinking skills, with
a light smattering of higher-order skills, such as writing a short
essay.39
Schools and teachers, faced with ever-increasing demands to avoid
the "failing school" label, will logically focus on
the curriculum content that is most likely to improve test scores.
Leaving aside the fact that these tests provide little useful
instructional feedback, the inevitable results will be that the
nation's curriculum will be narrowed and the level of expectations
will be lowered.40
Failing schools.
While the federal government has recently announced that the "failing"
label for schools should be replaced with the more politically
acceptable term "in need of improvement," the negative
moniker sticks in the minds of the people and of the media. Regardless
of the solid record of achievement test scores and the good graduation
rates of the nation's schools, public school critics have been
successful in painting schools as "failing," and they
have made the most of the cooperation of the media, which have
natural incentives to report negative news.
A plethora of estimates have been put forth regarding the number
of schools across the U.S. that will turn out to be failing under
NCLB. The Center for Assessment says 75%, North Carolina estimates
60%, Vermont calculated 80% over three years, and Louisiana reports
85% -- even though two-thirds of their schools show improved scores.41
Furthermore, as Lowell Rose has pointed out with regard to Indiana,
"A failing label will be assigned frequently, based on the
crushing impact of poverty." Students with large and diverse
populations will find it most difficult to show progress while
schools with a breakout group in special education will find it
impossible.42
Black students showed a 94% failure rate, while Hispanics registered
a 68% failure rate. Students who received free and reduced-price
lunches showed a 56% failure rate.
Schools labeled as "failing" will not receive their
label because they have failed. Rather, schools will be branded
because they are in poor or diverse neighborhoods, because they
are small and rural, because they are underfunded, and because
the AYP system cannot tell the difference between a learning gain
and random noise.
Dropouts. While it is still too early to determine whether
students will drop out of school as a result of the NCLB requirements,
an examination of the national longitudinal database shows that
students subjected to eighth-grade promotion examinations are
more likely to drop out by 10th grade.43 Anecdotal evidence suggests that
some students are encouraged (or provided subtle incentives) to
drop out. This is consistent with the "uncertainty principle"
mechanisms set forth by Amrein and Berliner. Simply put, the more
intense the negative consequences held over a system in an effort
to get high results, the more likely the system is to game the
rules to show better results.
Conclusion: Sure Costs, Uncertain Benefits
The No Child Left Behind law claims noble aims and sets unyielding
expectations for schools. Yet there is a troubling difference
between the language of the federal government and its actions.
While asking for the highest educational achievement scores in
the world, we ignore that we are, at best, mediocre in the commitment
of our substantial wealth to our schools. When it comes to equality
for all our children, the U.S. is among the least equitable nations
in the world.
It is in this context that NCLB has promised equality for all.
Yet in the 10 states profiled in this analysis, the costs for
making these promises a reality are far from being met. Seven
of the 10 states require new base investments in education of
at least 24%. The federal Administration has asked for an increase
of $1 billion in Title I, but we need at least $84.5 billion if
we are to make a realistic effort to leave no child behind. The
states, currently wallowing in deficits totaling $58 billion,
will be legally forced to take on these added burdens, but they
lack the capability. With war pushed to the front burner and another
tax cut planned, there is little reason to believe that federal
commitment in the form of federal dollars will follow federal
rhetoric.
If we were willing to fund our educational obligations to the
poor and the needy, the social benefits would be enormous. But
funding alone will do little to stop an unworkable AYP system
from randomly assigning punitive sanctions to our schools. The
system does not recognize that a hungry child with a poor, single
parent and a violent home may not be focused on phonics each morning.
The system does not ensure adequate money for an underfunded school.
It gives no promise that children will not have to go to a dilapidated
school. The system makes no distinction between a school with
well-educated parents and generous resources and an impoverished
school. Both schools are held to the same standard.
The program is likely to increase the number of dropouts, narrow
the curriculum, and label a great many schools as failing -- even
as NAEP reading and mathematics scores are at very high levels.
The effect will not simply be to punish schools and children for
failing when they never had a chance. The effect will be that
our society accepts a meaner vision of what it means to be educated
in America. The effect will be to take money from those schools
and those communities that need it most and transfer it to "successful"
schools. Ultimately, the effect will be to shift the purpose of
schools away from education for a democracy and away from the
provision of equal opportunities for all children.
If we are to work seriously to attain the goal of educating all
children, there are a number of requirements that must be met.
WILLIAM J. MATHIS is superintendent
of schools, Rutland Northeast Supervisory Union, Brandon, Vermont;
a senior fellow of the Vermont Society for the Study of Education;
and a National Superintendent of the Year finalist. He teaches
education finance at the University of Vermont and consults on
funding systems through the Rural Schools and Community Trust.
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